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NOTES
DUE PROCESS AT THE LINEUP

Following most crimes of violence law enforcement authorities must rely heavily on what the victim says about the offender's physical features, clothing, and general demeanor. Often
the only tangible link between the perpetrator and his crime
is the memory of this victim or witness. Despite an officer's
awareness of foibles of human memory, law enforcement officers
often must rely on an immediate "lineup." This is the only practical manner by which investigators can test the strength of their
case through the ability of the witness to identify the suspect
in question. The victim might be swayed by suggestions that
one or another is the right man in his eagerness to see the guilty
party brought to justice. This factor, in addition to the "zeal"
of the police officers to solve the case, bring into focus the
dangers inherent in the lineup process.
In a series of companion cases the United States Supreme
Court treated this problem.1 In United States v. Wade, 2 the
defendant was arrested for bank robbery. FBI agents conducted
a lineup, requiring all the men to wear strips of tape similar
to those worn by the robber and to speak words used by the
robber. Two bank employees picked Wade out of the lineup.
His appointed attorney was not informed of the lineup, however,
and Wade was not given an opportunity to contact him. Defense
counsel moved to strike the courtroom identification on the
ground that the lineup violated Wade's fifth s and sixth 4 amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered
a new trial excluding the in-court identifications. 5 The Supreme
Court then remanded the case to the district court for a hearing
on the issue of whether the in-court identification could be based
on independent recollections of the witnesses, untainted by the
illegal line-up.
0
In Gilbert v. California,
the defendant was placed in a

1. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
2. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3. U. S. CONST. Amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. .."
4. Id. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . .to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
5. 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
6. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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lineup and viewed by approximately 100 people without his
attorney being notified or the defendant being advised of his
right to have an attorney present. At trial two witnesses testified to their lineup identification and the courtroom identification. On appeal, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded
as it did in the Wade decision. However, it further held that the
lineup identification evidence could not be purged of taint as
could be the in-court identification.
In Stovall v. Denno,7 a habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant alleged that his rights were violated when he was
brought handcuffed to the hospital bedside of the victim, who
was in critical condition and in danger of dying. He was not
advised of the right to have counsel present at this confrontation. At the hospital he was forced to repeat certain words for
voice identification, and the victim subsequently made a courtroom identification of the accused. The Court held that the
procedures neither violated his privilege against self-incrimination nor deprived him of due process. Stovall's conviction was
affirmed.
The Court's concern is to see that an accused person is
viewed fairly by his victim without the presence of any suggestive influences. 8 This problem was based upon three basic
constitutional arguments: first, the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination is violated if he is required to stand in a
lineup or to speak for identification; second, a lineup, in the
absence of counsel, violates defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel; and third, the lineup, in the absence of counsel for
the accused, violates "due process."
The Court summarily dispensed with the allegation that
to place an accused in a lineup, 9 make him speak, 10 put on an
article of clothing," or assume a gesture 12 violates his privilege
7. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
8. "The few cases that have surfaced . . . reveal the existence of a
process attended with hazards of serious unfairness to the criminal accused
and strongly suggest the plight of the more numerous defendants who are
unable to ferret out suggestive influences in the secrecy of the confrontation." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1967).
9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (dictum); Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. Rsv. 610.
10. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
11. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
12. People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16 (1963),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 994 (1964).
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against self-incrimination.' s This privilege only extends to evidence of a "testimonial or communicative nature" and not to
physical or demonstrative evidence.' 4
Prior cases have avoided the issue of an accused's right to
counsel at lineup.' 5 The Massiah v. United States16 and Miranda
v. Arizona17 decisions held that the accused had a right to counsel
at the "critical" interrogation stage of the proceedings. 8 By
"critical" the Court means that there is a risk that the absence
of counsel might impair the defendant's ability to get a fair
trial.1 9
In Gilbert the court rejected the defense's allegation that
his sixth amendment right was violated by absence of counsel
at the taking of handwriting exemplars on the grounds that
there was only "minimal risk. ' 20 Since the lineup is a critical
stage, however, the defendent there has a right to counsel.2 1
The right to counsel at a lineup will allow defense counsel
to conduct a meaningful cross examination of the identifying
witness at the trial.2 2 The attorney is in a far better position to

reveal any possible unfairness or suggestion than is the accused.2 8
13. In this respect the court relies heavily on its reasonings in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1967), decided June 20, 1966, about one year
prior to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Schmerber was forced to
give a sample of his blood which was, over objection of his attorney, introduced into evidence to prove his intoxication. See Note on Schmerber
decision, 27 LA. L. Rzv. 329 (1967).
14. Schmerber v. California, 384 ,U.S. 757 (1966).
15. "[N]o court announced such a requirement until Wade was decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 299 (1967).
16. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. "The taking of the exemplars was not a 'critical' stage of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel. Putting
aside the fact that the exemplars were taken before the indictment and
appointment, there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might
derogate from his right to a fair trial." 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
21. In so holding the Court distinguished the Schmerber case as follows:
"In contrast (to Schmerber] in this case (Wade) it is urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup was indispensable to protect Wade's most basic
right as a criminal defendant-his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses
against him might be meaningfully cross-examined." United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1967).
22. "The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the
trial itself, operates to assure that the accused's interests will be protected
consistently with our adversary theory of criminal presecution. Id. at 227.
23. In Wade the court refers to the "plight of the more numerous defendants who are unable to ferret out suggestive influences." Id. at 234.
"[Als is the case with secret interrogations, there is serious difficulty in
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He can be more objective about the proceedings than the often
confused and frightened accused, especially in the case of the
youthful suspect.
The presence of counsel may also protect the accused from
being forced to take the stand in order to rebut police allegations based on evidence adduced from an unfair lineup.2 4 Even
if he does take the stand, the jury, absent an observing attorney, has only the defendant's unsupported version against the
25
officer's version.
An earlier case held that an unfair lineup could make the
identification of the defendant inadmissible.2 6 In Palmer v.
Peyton,27 while the sheriff questioned the defendant in another
room, the victim was allowed to listen after having been notified that a suspect was in custody. 28 The victim had told officers
the assailant had a high childlike voice, but there were no
other voices with which to compare the defendant's. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals felt this was so grossly unfair as to
deny the defendant the due process of law.
However, in Stovall v. Denno29 the identification was upheld
by the Supreme Court despite the fact that the accused, handcuffed to one of five policemen, was the sole person observed.
The confrontation necessarily took place at the critically
wounded victim's hospital bedside.
Fairness in the lineup is the key point in the due process
claim. The Court is afraid that the defendant, unassisted by an
observing attorney, risks conviction by faulty identification.
Thus right to counsel and due process claims are closely related
to the lineup situation. It appears the right to counsel is extended
to lineups to guard against unfair treatment which the undepicting what transpires at lineups and other forms of identification."
Id. at 230.
24. "Even when he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal record he

may be reluctant to take the stand and open up the admission of prior
convictions." Id. at 231.
25. "Moreover, any protestations by the suspect of the fairness of the

lineup made at the trial are likely to be in vain; the jury's choice is between
the accused's unsupported version and that of the police officers present."
Ibid.
26. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
27. Ibid.
28. The defendant also had a high voice.
29. Because Mrs. Behrendt was hospitalized in critical condition and in
danger of dying, the court felt "on the facts of this case petitioner was not
deprived of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."

388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967).
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assisted defendant might find difficult to recognize-and later,
to prove.
The Court will require defendants to submit to scrutiny
regarding their physical characteristics, i.e., voice, handwriting,
size, fingerprints, and the like, as long as there is no danger that
unfairness to the accused may result from the procedure employed. The lawyer is necessary to act as a "third pair of eyes".
which will unveil the secrecy and bring out any unfairness
practiced in the lineup process.
The Court has implied that procedures which insure uniform and fair treatment in a "meaningful confrontation"' 0 may
be sufficient to fulfill all constitutional requirements.8 1
Formulation of lineup procedures which might satisfy constitutional requirements without the presence of counsel deserves consideration. Convenience and efficiency in investigative
work and availability of counsel, especially in indigent situations are not the only reasons for developing such procedures.
Speedy release of suspects cleared by lineup is important.
Lineup procedures in accordance with the following suggestions should provide an obvious guarantee of fairness. The
lineup must be so conducted that the identification can be made
without unwarranted influence. To that end, all lineups should
be photographed and each person should be photographed
individually.8 2 All police departments should be required to
maintain a room where lineups are to be held. They should
be built to certain designated specifications and so constructed
that the accused and victims cannot observe one another prior
to the lineups. All subjects should be required to dress in
identical fashion. Whenever possible, the defendant himself
should be required to pick out the subjects who are to stand
with him in the lineup.33 This should help assure a physical
resemblance between those in the lineup. The accused should
be allowed to choose his position in the lineup. No less than
three other subjects unknown to the viewer and the accused
30. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
31. "Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at
lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at
trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as 'critical'." Id.
at 239.
32. These photographs are to be full-length and of the faces.
33. Murray, The Criminal LAne-up at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L,
REv. 610.
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should constitute a valid lineup. The names, addresses, photographs, height, age, weight, and signature of participants should
be made available to the defendant or his attorney. 84
The viewer should be required to write the number of the
person identified on a plain slip of paper. He should also specify,.
whenever possible, what physical features or characteristics
prompted his identification of the subject. This slip should be
signed and dated by the witness and initialed by the officers and
the accused.
In the event that circumstances are such that the procedures
outlined are impossible to follow, a warrant should be obtained
from a judge setting forth the specific circumstances surrounding
the confrontation and the reasons why normal procedures could
not be followed.
With these safeguards, the absence of counsel at a lineup
will not impair the meaningful and effective cross-examination
of eye witnesses concerning their recognition of the defendant.
The uniform procedures and records of the lineup will reveal
any irregularities. They will also insure the accused of a fair
lineup which affords a reasonable choice to the witness attempting the identification. It will also avoid suggestion and influence,
whether intentional or unintentional, which might affect the
choice made by the witness. Such obviously fair procedures will
eliminate any substantial risk of prejudice to the accused-thus
possibly negating the contention that this is a "critical" stage
of the proceedings where counsel must be afforded the defendant
since the need for counsel will have been supplanted by proper
legislative safeguards. This will provide law enforcement with
a more expedient and efficient method of identifying and convicting the guilty while protecting the innocent.
Even if the Court should not accept such regulations as a
full substitute for the right to counsel, the procedure would
still serve a very significant function. Should waiver of counsel
be given by the accused, the courts would be far more likely to
find it was intelligent waiver where the procedure submitted to
was obviously fair.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
34. This would insure the defense attorney that he could duplicate the
lineup at trial if necessary in order to impeach the pretrial identification.

* Editor's Note-Mr. Joseph is an Administrative Assistant to the District Attorney for East Baton Rouge Parish. His investigative duties involve
the use of lineups.

